這是人民的選擇 (之四)。
針對布胡熱線的談話，馬英九肯定胡錦濤的最新說法（顯然這位英文通看不懂中文），國民黨大陸事務部主任張榮恭也說，這是胡錦濤第一次正式承認「一中各表」的九二共識。
令人不解的是，馬英九和國民黨過去信誓旦旦，強調一中各表就是九二共識的內涵（一副中共也都有各表的共識），如今又說，這是中國第一次正式承認，反證國民黨過去的說法，完全是毫無根據的謊言。(自由時報3/30/2008)
中國政府是否承認「九二共識」就是「一中各表」，目前共出現五個不同版本。中國外交部網站上的中英文稿，都提到了「在九二共識的基礎上恢復兩岸協商談判是我們的一貫立場」，同時也都提到協商要在「一個中國原則的基礎上」，沒有「一中各表」的文字。新華社在中文版的新聞稿中，用語幾乎和外交部新聞稿一樣；但英文稿卻指，胡錦濤告訴布希：「在九二共識的基礎上恢復兩岸協商談判是我們的一貫立場，也就是雙方都承認只有一個中國，但同意各自表述。」白宮國安顧問海德利則在簡報會上透露了類似訊息。。(自由時報3/30/2008)
繼續閱讀......今天在簡余晏部落格看到一篇，讓我們努力把台灣意識升級為WEB2.0的文章，心有同感，我在本網站成立之初，就看到只有善加利用最新的網路技術，才能壓倒顛倒是非，造謠烏龍的統派媒體，現在是公民媒體(citizen journalism) 的時代，就連中國極力要管制圖博(Tibet)暴動的新聞，也無法得逞，(Beijing's blocking of the Web sites was not 100 percent effective)，專制腐敗終將被時代的大巨輪所輾滅，讓我們相互抵勵繼續加油，台灣意識加油！台灣建國加油！
p.s. 想知道圖博最近繼續在發生，中國軍警迫害圖博人的消息：《台灣圖博之友會》
繼續閱讀......這是人民的選擇 (之三)。
馬英九在3月7日、12日的電視辯論會，公開要求扁政府要凍漲水電油等民生物資直到520，旗下賴世葆大委員在07年11月初，痛批油價漲是「何不食肉糜」，政府只好宣布在520之前油水電民生物資都「凍漲」。馬英九當選之後，賴世葆變了調，指出「台灣中油與台電公司今年的虧損可能達二千億元，國營事業虧損由國庫承受，相當全國每人都要負擔一萬元，如果台電想要損益兩平，每度電的價格必須調漲五毛，漲幅逼近二十％」，四個月後總算被他發現到，原來還是該漲價。馬英九：水電價應交由新政府處理
油價520前凍漲爭議 綠批藍矛盾
油價凍不凍漲都罵 綠批藍矛盾 (轉載自自由時報3/26/2008)
選前消費凍漲議題 藍自食惡果
三立新聞今天撥出賴士葆選前要求凍漲的質詢畫面，
及綠營立委反諷馬英九選前3/7、3/12要求水電油等民生物資，
凍漲到520新內閣接任為止的畫面。
這是人民的選擇 (之二)，
立法院國民黨軍系立委林郁方及周守訓，在國防委員會作出決議案，偏袒提高特定少數族群「眷村住戶」的福利，同時還要求把那些眷戶的房租補助金調高。(自由時報 3/27/2008)
眷村改建條例法案，能夠輕易在立法院通過完成法定程序，那是一筆需花費一兆兩千兩百九十億龐大人民血汗錢的「錢坑法案」，受惠眷村住戶三十五萬人，由稅金平白送他們每人三百二十萬元，換句更切身我們的話來說，平均每位台灣人民要無條件替這些「上等國民」負擔五萬元。(自由廣場 3/27/2008)
立法院廿五日程序委員會上，國民黨立委楊瓊纓所提的補助村里長出國考察，以及楊仁福所提的敬老津貼、原住民敬老津貼皆從三千元加碼到六千元等修正案，都在藍營人數優勢下排入周五院會報告事項。 
選後藍委馬上推錢坑法案，這些法案都需要龐大預算支撐，明顯是＜買票綁樁＞ 條款，他，馬的買票還用我們繳的稅金！ 讓村里長增加這麼多「好康」的，粗估每年要五十億元。這些法案都需要龐大預算支撐，在財源無著的情況下，還不是從納稅人身上再抽一層！村里長除了本薪每月四萬五元之外，平白又多了這麼多好康的。用老百姓納稅的錢來償還選前＜買票綁樁＞的債，國民黨把我們這些拼死活死拼命賺錢的人民當提款機。尋找夢想的天空 (3/27/2008)
丟出這個題目，我不是要未卜先知說，台灣的政治社會，經過這次選舉之後，會變成什麼樣子？我恍如乍然初醒，最大的感觸是，時代改變的太快了，台灣新的中堅世代所想的、所抱持的價值，真的和我們這群50歲以上的LKK大不相同了。民進黨或者是說泛綠的支持者，最大的失敗就是沒有看到這一點，初選時的十一寇所代表的，原來就是這一波新的民意啊。
但我們所堅持的價值觀難道錯了嗎？我們致力還原台灣的歷史真相，二二八大屠殺、白色恐怖、美麗島抗爭、林宅血案、軍公教18趴，法院是國民黨開的等罄竹難書的悲情，我們強烈主張轉型正義，我們要幸福經濟，要照顧中南部、中下階層、中小企業，要照顧弱勢，這都錯了嗎？然後選舉輸了之後，就要有民主的風度，要卑躬屈膝自我檢討。大話新聞的吳國棟說希望民進黨不要再檢討輸的原因在黨產的不公、媒體的抹黑、買票賄選等，要趕快提出改革的方案，讓人民感動的新產品。
問題是新的世代是"很夯"、"ㄍ一ㄥ"、"機車"、"XD"等流行語的世代了， 比較謝長廷的黑眼鏡、小個子、本土實在的形象，馬英九的俊臉蛋、短褲慢跑、沒有啦的嗲聲，反而瘋迷了新世代。看來"布爾喬亞"vs."一高二低"（年紀高、學歷低、薪水低）的錯誤價值觀，倒著實深植在新一代的中堅份子裏，莊國榮、杜正勝的土直堅持，反而被無限放大嘲諷。如果民主就是少數服從多數，如果說民進黨應該世代交替，新的價值將取代舊的價值，2008後的台灣會是什麼樣子，這不是極大的諷刺嗎？我們這群50歲以上的LKK，都經歷過中國國民黨時代的濫權腐敗，所帶給我們長期的苦悶，看到這樣的選舉結果，再想想新的世代新的價值變成這樣，一如民主前輩金美齡女士，是多麼的絕望失落啊！這「世代交替」一直是進行式，我們疏忽了，原本就是一場極度不公平的競爭，小台灣對大中國，沒錢的民進黨對財大氣粗的國民黨，大中國+國民黨再繼續以"讓你們好賺錢"的糖衣，丟棄本土教育，再灌輸新的一代大中國意識教育，這沒完沒了的惡性循環，是絕對不能再輕忽了。
有一點值得慶幸的是，現在中國國民黨完全執政了，沒有了唱衰的對象，要完全負成敗的責任；包括在野黨的所有台灣人民正可以用放大鏡，很有風度的每天釘著，好好檢驗監督這隻龐然怪物。只希望怪物不要有一天老羞成怒，重新揮動「白色恐怖」的怪手，那就非台灣之福了。另一方面，544萬人所堅持的價值觀絕不能放棄喪志，要以創新的內涵，嶄新的包裝重新感動所有台灣人民。世代交替就是這樣嗎？四年一次的選舉，真的有希望再逆轉勝嗎？沒關係，四年不行八年，八年不行十二年，終有一天要拿回政權，那時候就是台灣要揚眉吐氣建國的時候了。
這就是我為這個部落格的定位，日本西武集團的總裁後藤高志曾說過一句話：「沒有熬不過的黑夜，沒有等不到的黎明」，大家努力！！！
繼續閱讀......馬英九說他不會當國際的麻煩製造者 (trouble maker)，乍聽之下也有道理，但是會是製造麻煩的領導者，通常是在跟自己國家的利益產生衝突時，所做的選擇。北韓、蘇丹等獨裁者除外，各位看以色列、科索沃等國家，雖然她們讓美國、蘇俄老大哥頭痛，但是為了自己國家的利益所以理直氣壯。馬英九先跟美國示好，要做乖寶寶，又同中國說，他會接受一中原則，通通把自己的底牌先掀給大家看，這合乎台灣人的利益嗎？
我重新翻起美國亞太副助卿柯慶生去年9月的演說，詳述美國對於台灣的正式立場(自由時報(9/13/2007) 就是，需要是個國家才能參加的國際性組織，台灣沒有資格。簡單的解釋就是，美國把台灣當作她在太平洋防線的一顆馬前卒，要你花錢買她的武器，不但賺了你的錢，並且為了她在中國的商業利益，更是無所不用其極的對台灣頤指氣使。美國現在一定在想，國民黨行政立法大權在握，不會像陳水扁那樣壞剃頭，老是為台灣的主權及立場著想，軍購一定會過，也不會去惹中國，有這樣的乖寶寶，她真的好高興。
我在internet找出演講的原文，結果是在多數的中國網站及聯合報上找到，會看英文的話，你看了對照我上面說的，不會生氣嗎？難怪國際上都看不起台灣，台灣人要有點骨氣及尊嚴！其實美國人是你越有骨氣，雖然是麻煩製造者，他會越尊重你。我2000年有一次在東京的美國商務總會(American Chamber of Commerce in Japan)，聽一位當時美國國務院的高級官員演說，談到東亞及海峽兩岸局勢，對於台灣的地位極盡貶抑之能事，我和他辯論為什麼不能讓台灣成為一個正常國家？他自知理虧也沒能說什麼，但我知道他是尊重了解我的立場的。Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council
Thomas J. Christensen
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
United States-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference
September 11, 2007
Annapolis, Maryland
A Strong and Moderate Taiwan
Vice Minister Ko Cheng-heng, Dr. Su Chi, Rupert, other distinguished guests, I am delighted to be able to speak today at this important event. Many thanks to all of you for being here – especially our friends from Taiwan, who have taken time from busy schedules and traveled so far. I would also like to thank the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, which has established this conference as the premier annual venue for discussing Taiwan's security. As the State Department's representative, I will touch on broad issues in Taiwan security in my remarks this morning, leaving detailed questions of defense strategy and arms procurement to the military experts. My remarks represent the agreed views of the United States Government. I invite you to consider my comments in that light.
This conference is timely. In the year ahead, we will again celebrate Taiwan's democracy, and we will also closely follow how Taiwan's leaders navigate the often difficult circumstances in relations across the Taiwan Strait. Their actions will be a major factor in determining whether the interests of their people are protected; whether Taiwan will continue to flourish in an environment of peace and security; or whether all that Taiwan has achieved might be put at risk by cross-Strait tensions or, worse still, conflict.
For reasons that I will elaborate in a moment, the United States has an abiding interest in a stable and peaceful relationship across the Taiwan Strait in which Taiwan thrives. Anything that makes Taiwan stronger and safer is good for the United States, and, for obvious reasons, is also good for the people of Taiwan. Anything that places such peace and stability at risk runs directly against the interests of the United States. For these reasons, we look to Taiwan to adopt strategies toward cross-Strait relations that combine strength – both military and economic – with moderation. When we see policies that diverge from these goals, we owe it to ourselves and to the Taiwan people to speak out.
Origins of U.S. Interest
I would first like to address two fundamental questions: why does the United States care about Taiwan's security, and what is the basis for our expression of views on this important subject? The answers to the first are straight-forward. As a Pacific power with global interests and obligations, the United States has a natural interest in peace throughout Asia. Because the Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint for conflict, the area demands our constant attention. Meanwhile, through our decades of close friendship with the people of Taiwan, we have acquired deep admiration for their achievements under difficult circumstances and a special concern for their democracy, freedom from coercion, and prosperity. A successful Taiwan is a beacon for East Asia and beyond. Finally, U.S. support for Taiwan is enshrined in U.S. domestic law in the Taiwan Relations Act. In short, strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a continuous U.S. interest in Taiwan and its security.
The same arguments, in turn, give us a legitimate voice on issues touching on Taiwan security. Naturally, judgments about how to defend Taiwan rest ultimately with the people of Taiwan, as articulated through their democratic institutions. We respect that prerogative. At the same time, to defend our own interests, satisfy our legal obligations, and, indeed, support people whom we regard as old friends, we believe we are right to express our views, including our real concerns, regarding Taiwan's security policies. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the Taiwan people will decide for themselves how to respond to the views expressed by their friends in the United States.
With that, I would like to speak today about Taiwan's security in the broadest sense and about the factors that are critical to sustaining it. Everything I say here is based on a recognition of the growing PRC military threat to Taiwan posed by the fast-paced military build-up opposite Taiwan and by Beijing's refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan. The United States has demonstrated its rejection of any coercion of Taiwan through both its defensive arms sales to Taipei and maintenance of our unilateral capability to respond to such coercion, if our President were so to choose. Actions speak louder than words, and no one on either side of the Strait has an excuse for being ignorant of U.S. expectations and determination to protect our own interests. At the same time, our resolute defense of these interests has benefited the region for decades, providing the indispensable conditions for stability in the Strait, a dramatic increase in prosperity on both sides, rich and growing cross-Strait connections, and a democratic transformation on Taiwan that is an inspiration to the world.
The Need for Taiwan's Strength and Moderation
As I stated at the outset, the United States believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to the immediate and long-term security needs of the people of Taiwan. Anything less than strength and moderation leaves Taiwan vulnerable, endangers regional peace, and potentially threatens U.S. interests. Let me address these two fundamental elements in turn.
A Strong Taiwan
A strong Taiwan is, very simply, one that maintains the military capacity to withstand coercion for an extended period of time. To the extent Beijing knows it cannot subdue Taiwan swiftly -- before the international community would be able to react -- deterrence is reinforced. Taiwan's prosperity and social stability are, of course, additional sources of strength, but the military dimension is indispensable. A Taiwan that can defend itself is a major factor for peace. A strong Taiwan can also negotiate with Beijing with greater confidence and thereby pursue more effectively durable, equitable arrangements for cross-Strait peace.
After a frankly disappointing performance for several years, there recently has been good news in this area. In budgetary terms alone, Taipei has done much to provide for its defense. For some time the Taiwan defense budget declined as a percentage of GDP. Even during that period, however, it remained substantial – higher than in all but a few other Asian peers. As a portion of a large economy, those budgets provided a basis for some progress. This year, the defense budget has at last begun to increase as a portion of GDP. We congratulate Taiwan's leaders from all major parties for finding a way to break this logjam.
Funding is only part of the defense equation, of course. Taiwan also is pursuing smarter priorities and defensive strategies. It is allocating more money to hardening and sustainment, and it is embracing modern warfighting doctrine, taking advantage of Taiwan's greatest practical asset, its geography. Taiwan and its surroundings constitute an intrinsically challenging military environment, and wise defense expenditures and planning can keep it that way.
U.S. arms sales have played an important role in keeping Taiwan strong, and, of course, today's audience has a special interest in the subject. The Bush Administration demonstrated its recognition of the U.S. role when it approved its 2001 arms package. The Administration's commitment to fulfillment of TRA requirements remains beyond question. The principal issue in Taiwan's defense, however, is not whether Taipei buys a particular weapon system or whether that system comes from domestic factories or from abroad. The principal issue is the substance of Taiwan's overall defensive strategy and the maintenance of core capacities to sustain it. And the decision on that strategy, once again, rests with the Taiwan people themselves. Frankly, an abiding U.S. concern is that Taiwan as yet has still not had the sort of sustained, general debate on security that we think it deserves. We hope that, in the coming election season, the people of Taiwan will demand of their political candidates an intelligent and productive discussion of this profoundly important subject.
At the same time, I want to give credit to both Taiwan's ruling party and the opposition for the very real progress that they have made in recent years. Under President Chen's leadership, the MND has begun compiling more sophisticated budgets and sought increases in overall funding. For its part, the opposition-controlled legislature has performed its role by vetting and passing these budgets, giving the executive branch most of what it requested. The United States welcomes these developments as hopeful signs that we are witnessing a maturation of the public debate on Taiwan, one in which political leaders lay aside damaging accusations against one another's basic patriotism and agree to place defense above partisan politics. Whether or not these recent events become a long-term trend will depend on leaders from all political parties, including many in the audience today.
A Moderate Taiwan
I would now like to turn to the other indispensable dimension of Taiwan's security, a moderate, sophisticated, effective political approach toward cross-Strait relations. Without moderation, Taiwan's security will be compromised, no matter how much money Taipei spends on defense and no matter how wisely those defense dollars have been allocated. On the other hand, all things being equal, a moderate approach by Taipei to relations across the Strait will reduce the challenges faced by Taiwan's armed forces.
Taiwan occupies a delicate and, indeed, unique political position. The absence of a resolution of cross-Strait disputes causes understandable frustration among many people, but it's a fact of life that the majority of Taiwan citizens understand. That recognition is reflected in opinion polling that shows powerful, consistent support for the status quo.
In terms of security, the proposition is reasonably simple: as long as Taiwan maintains a credible defensive capability, the chief threats to its welfare are political actions by Taipei itself that could trigger Beijing's use of force. The United States has repeatedly made clear that the use of force would be unacceptable, and we have repeatedly called on Beijing to demonstrate more military transparency, to cease its arms buildup opposite Taiwan, and to reduce its armed threat to Taiwan. But as much as we oppose Beijing's threat to use force, we also take it seriously, and Taipei cannot afford to do otherwise. It is for this reason that Taiwan's security is inextricably linked to the avoidance of needlessly provocative behavior. This does not mean that Taipei should or can be passive in the face of PRC pressure. But it means that responsible leadership in Taipei has to anticipate potential Chinese red lines and reactions and avoid unnecessary and unproductive provocations.
The USG's recent expression of concern about certain policies advocated by the Chen Administration has flowed directly from this perspective. I want to emphasize that the overall U.S.-Taiwan relationship is as close and mutually beneficial as ever. The friendship between the American people and the people of Taiwan has deep roots and continues to flourish. The disagreements that have arisen occur in a comparatively narrow part of the U.S.-Taiwan agenda. Since it is the part that directly relates to peace and stability, however, the disagreement is very important.
In particular, we have expressed special concern about Chen Administration support for a proposed referendum on UN membership in the name of Taiwan. Much has been said on Taiwan about U.S. positions, a lot of it wrong. Let me try to provide some clarity.
The United States is not opposed to referenda; Taiwan is as entitled to hold referenda as is any other democracy. But the topic and content of any particular referendum must be considered. A referendum on applying to the UN without the suggestion of name change as part of that referendum – while striking us as odd and unproductive - would not elicit a very strong reaction from the United States. Given that everyone knows the bulk of Taiwan's citizens would like to see Taipei apply to the United Nations and given that such a referendum would have no prospect of improving the likelihood of success in such an application, everybody would know that support for such a referendum would only be useful in domestic political posturing in Taiwan. For the United States' part, the matter of how to respond would be straightforward: we would reiterate that we do not support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that require statehood and therefore would not support such a referendum. (需要是個國家才能參加的國際性組織，台灣沒有資格)
The particular referendum supported by President Chen concerns us considerably more than would a generic referendum on applying to the UN. What worries us, very specifically, is the issue of name change. This draft referendum raises the question of what Taiwan should be called in the international community. Moreover, it does so in what could be interpreted by many to be a legally-binding popular vote. In an ideal world, we would not have to worry about this. In the vernacular, we all speak of "Taiwan." The State Department does, people in Taiwan do, even Beijing does. So why worry about using the same word in this more formal political and legal context? The simple reality is that, in the world of cross-Strait relations, political symbolism matters, and disagreements over it could be the source of major tensions or even conflict. President Chen recognized the importance of such "symbolic" issues in 2000 and 2004 when he promised our President and the international community not to pursue a change in Taiwan's official name, and he has reaffirmed that promise repeatedly.
It is the apparent pursuit of name change in the referendum, therefore, that makes the initiative appear to us to be a step intended to change the status quo. Arguments that the referendum, even if passed, would not amount to a pursuit of name change, frankly, strike us as purely legalistic. After all, if the specific nomenclature does not matter, why include it in the referendum in the first place? At a fundamental level, such legalistic arguments from supporters of the referendum make it seem that they do not take seriously Taiwan's commitments to the United States and the international community, are willing to ignore the security interests of Taiwan's most steadfast friend, and are ready to put at some risk the security interests of the Taiwan people for short-term political gain. Our bottom line is that the potential downsides of such an initiative for Taiwan and U.S. interests are potentially large, and, as with any UN referendum, the benefits for Taiwan's international status are non-existent, so we must oppose such an initiative strongly.
I would like to face head-on the accusation that the U.S. position on the referendum constitutes interference in Taiwan's democracy. On behalf of the U.S. Government, I reject this accusation categorically. Given the decades of America's commitment to Taiwan's security and support for its democratization, the idea just does not stand up to scrutiny. The reality is that democracies can and do disagree over policies. It happens all the time around the world. Moreover, friends have an obligation to warn friends who are moving in an unwise direction. The U.S. obligation is even stronger, given our interest in Taiwan's security. After all, it is not just Taiwan's peace and stability that Taipei's actions may threaten.
The United States has neither the power nor the right to tell the Taiwan people what they can and cannot do. As friends, however, we feel it is our obligation to warn that the content of this particular referendum is ill-conceived and potentially quite harmful. Bad public policy initiatives are made no better for being wrapped in the flag of "democracy." Fortunately, if the referendum goes forward unchanged, we anticipate that Taiwan's perceptive, intelligent citizens will see through the rhetoric and make a sound judgment that the referendum does not serve their interests because it will be fundamentally harmful to Taiwan's external relations.
Beyond the obvious threat to stability in the Taiwan Strait, the United States also opposes the proposed referendum because it will do the exact opposite of what it promises: it will limit, not expand, Taiwan's international space. Arguments to the contrary sound heroic, but they stand in opposition to the evidence all around us. I can say this to you with real experience, because it is the State Department that takes the lead in the U.S. Government in trying to help preserve and expand the Taiwan people's international space. The frustrating truth is that needlessly provocative actions by Taipei strengthen Beijing's hand in limiting Taiwan's space and scare away potential friends who might help Taiwan.
This is again an area where we have to acknowledge a tough truth. Whether we like it or not, most countries in the world accept Beijing's characterization of Taiwan, and, when energized, the PRC can call in overwhelming support to marginalize Taipei. The Taiwan people are, of course, long accustomed to PRC pressure, and we are certainly not telling them not to resist these efforts; our own position is far from passive. That said, Taipei needs to push back intelligently and in a sophisticated manner that plays to its strengths. Frontal assaults on Beijing's sensitivities are bound to fail and, at the end of the day, leave Taipei further behind. The referendum on applying to the UN under the name Taiwan is just such a frontal assault with no hope of changing Taiwan's actual status on the international stage while increasing cross-Strait tensions and alienating potential supporters of Taiwan's increased international space.
I would like to emphasize that we do not like having to express publicly our disagreement with the Chen Administration on this or any other policy. Taiwan is a longstanding U.S. friend, and we do not like there to be gaps between us on important issues. I can assure you that we would not have done so had we not exhausted every private opportunity through consistent, unmistakable, and authoritative messages over an extended period of time. The problem here is not misunderstanding or lack of communications: it is that we believe this initiative is not good for Taiwan or us and that we have found ourselves with no alternative but to express our views directly to the Taiwan people.
A Confident Taiwan
While I am using this podium to convey tough truths, let me raise a more positive point that is not often mentioned but deserves to be: let me debunk the myth that the people of Taiwan are isolated or that Taiwan is an international orphan. Yes, Taipei has formal diplomatic relationships with only a small number of states, and it is not a member of the United Nations. The reality, however, is that Taiwan could not be the first world, democratic, commercial powerhouse it is if it were not extensively integrated into global society. Its citizens could not travel the world on business and pleasure, its airliners and freighters could not span the globe, and it could not be one of the world's premier sources of information technology. Taipei may not have many embassies, but it has dozens of unofficial offices around the planet staffed with professional representatives who carry on the business of the people of Taiwan. In the trade arena alone, Taipei would be an economic backwater if it were not thoroughly linked into the dense web of global institutions that support international commerce. Many of Taipei's most important relationships are unofficial, and yet genuine communication and cooperation goes on every day of the year.
To confirm this, just follow the news to see the steady stream of senior Taiwan officials who visit Washington and other parts of the United States. People often focus on the absence of visits at the highest levels, but those are infrequent in any relationship. For anybody who bothers to pay attention, it quickly becomes clear that the U.S.-Taiwan dialogue is comparable in substance and scope to that with any other medium-size partner.
I am not trying to downplay the genuine limitations on the international space of the Taiwan people, and I appreciate the frustrations that these must generate. At the end of the day, Taiwan occupies an unusual place in the global community. For Taiwan’s elected leadership, the challenge ahead is how to maximize the people's interest within this context. Fortunately, Taiwan has done remarkably well, and, when Taipei plays its hand well, it has a range of positive opportunities in the years ahead.
Strategic U.S. Interests
The United States has a consistent policy toward the Taiwan Strait. Year in and year out, and over administrations from both major parties, that policy has provided great benefits not only for the American people but also for the people of Taiwan. If there is any doubt about this, just consider Taiwan's circumstances at the time of de-recognition nearly 30 years ago now. Its vibrant democracy and prosperous, first world society today offer a vastly better life to the people of Taiwan. And as a friend of Taiwan, as an indispensable supporter of its democracy and freedoms, the United States ranks second to none. Americans can feel justifiably proud for having done the right thing, again and again.
While our support for Taiwan is beyond question, nobody here will be surprised if I say that the United States defines its own interests and interprets East Asian regional developments for it. There is, therefore, absolutely no foundation to the assertion that the United States coordinates its Taiwan policy with Beijing. It just does not happen. Words like coordination and cooperation simply do not apply to the relationship between Washington and Beijing on Taiwan policy. Do Chinese views influence U.S. thinking? Of course: we would be reckless, as would Taipei, if we did not take them into consideration. But I can assure you that no USG official at any level spends any amount of time coordinating our policies toward Taiwan with Beijing. Rumors of such coordination abound, but as with many rumors, they have no basis in fact.
By the same token, while we have a close, friendly relationship with Taipei, we also do not let Taipei define our positions. For well-established reasons, the United States has declared its opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait. Some Taiwan leaders in recent years have asserted that Taiwan independence is the status quo that should be defended. On that point, let me be perfectly clear: while U.S. opposition to Chinese coercion of Taiwan is beyond question, we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, and we do not accept the argument that provocative assertions of Taiwan independence are in any way conducive to maintenance of the status quo or peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For the reasons I have given above, in fact, we rank such assertions along with the referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan as needless provocations that are patently not in the best interests of the Taiwan people or of the United States.
Conclusion
Let me bring this presentation to a close by returning to the fundamental issue that has brought all of us together here. Regardless of whether members of this audience are officials in President Chen's Administration, opposition party leaders, U.S. corporate executives, journalists, scholars, or U.S. Government officials, we all share an abiding interest in the security of Taiwan, an important friend of the United States occupying a delicate position in a sensitive neighborhood. The United States Government believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and we will remain the steadfast partner of the people of Taiwan as they seek to advance their interests in the years ahead.
繼續閱讀......還記得去年8月底，美國國安會亞太資深主任韋德寧公開表示，台灣或者中華民國目前在國際社會不是一個國家(自由時報(9/1/2007)，這是美國官員首度公開做如此明白的宣示。也就是說，在國際的認知是，「中華民國」的國號及其所屬土地和人民已經被「中華人民共和國」取代。我3月22日選舉結果出爐的當晚，寫了一篇感文，今天台灣人選出台灣地區領導人，台灣多數的人接受了馬英九說的，現在主權問題可以擱置不談，將來的方向是終極統一，認為"自己不是國家"這件事並不重要。不過要記住，544萬台灣人要有自己國家的意志是不容改變的。英文原文如下，
US National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs, Dennis Wilder said in the white house press conference on August 28 that Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a state in the international community. He also stated that "The position of the United States government is that the ROC -- Republic of China -- is an issue undecided, and it has been left undecided for many, many years." Business Wire (8/30/2007)
This is the most clear message by an US official to state the position of the US on the issue of Taiwan. It means that Taiwan is not a nation at this point but can be a nation in the future. ROC was already replaced by PRC and the name of Republic of China cannot be used again.
繼續閱讀......綠色部落客夢裡不知身是客，寫了一篇文明的速度，引起藍色及所謂中間選民的認同，其中一句話，"綠色的那種本士才是愛台灣的瞧不起態度、真的讓我很火大"，真讓我百思不解。是的，我承認民主的精神就是要少數服從多數，但是中國國民黨50年的黨國威權，過去8年的顛倒是非糟蹋台灣，是可以託負政權的嗎？記得日治時期，日本人了解台灣人「愛錢，怕死」，是中國人的性格，也是台灣人性格的一部份，在這次大選可以證明，大多數選民顯然支持避戰（反入聯公投）和顧肚子（拚經濟）。台灣人被外來政權統治數百年，確實還有「奴性」在，這次又被中國國民黨善加利用，這樣的結果只能叫人仰天長嘆。
(像我這種想法的人被歸類為深綠的基本教義派，據我的觀察，四年級以上的中老年人，大都屬於此派，也是最了解中國國民黨的邪惡本質。)
不過台灣人還是有希望的，只要對照2004年和2008年選輸的候選人的風度 (如下圖片)，相信老天爺終將還給台灣一個公道，雖然未來的這條路會非常艱辛。
謝長廷：接受敗選事實，聚集我們的力量，繼續熱愛台灣（←台灣玉山長昌台）
2004年連戰、宋楚瑜敗選，提出“選舉無效之訴”
不過話說回來，雖然要有風度，但是風度是表現在公平的競爭之下，你要如何去跟擁有不公不義黨產，舖天蓋地不實的廣告，無法無天的買票賄選競爭？這才真是「民主暗夜，梟叫狼嚎」。我們雖然不會像泛藍一般選輸不服氣，一鬧鬧了八年。但我們絕不會向邪惡認輸，我們維護真理與公平正義的聲音絕不容許消失。
繼續閱讀......昨天我寫了一篇選後感言，期待可以，但還是要靠自己，覺得選後的綠營普遍的氣氛是包容和諧，期待馬英九和他的中國國民黨，能為台灣這塊土地及人民好好做事，立意自然不錯，我也很受感動。今天起床不自覺心裏打了一個寒顫，從另一個角度來看，這不就是白色恐怖下的寒蟬效應，慢慢都要回來了嗎？
請參考台灣民主先知彭明敏先生，於2008年3月9日在自由時報發表的文章，請留一條生機給後代吧！中國國民黨過去威權時代製造了二二八事件、白色恐怖、「林宅血案」，大辣辣的自稱法院是國民黨開的等，再加上這8年來在社會上全面操弄倒扁情緒，製造台灣藍綠對立的「恨意」。那一點是把台灣當作自己的土地疼惜？國民黨的權貴一向都是過路客的心理，將來是要反攻大陸、終極統一的。現在檯面上的政治人物也都是這些權貴的子弟，完全同樣的心態。現在有機會一如過去，行政、立法、司法、軍警特、檢調，全面掌控，你想他會謙虛傾聽人民的聲音，建立廉能的政府，真正為台灣做事嗎？早點睏喀有眠，門兒都沒有。有一個指標大家可以觀察，我預告李慶安會當教育部長，把杜正勝所推行的本土教育，全部都改回大中國意識教育，你信不信？很多綠營可愛的台灣囝仔還天真的說，四年後還要再來逆轉勝。新一代的小孩子都將再度被洗腦，有可能嗎？這是惡夢的開始。
我要寫下這篇文章做為記錄，替將來寫台灣歷史的人做見證，八年來陳水扁政府堅持民主，讓我能自由思考，想說什麼就說什麼，百分之百從來不用怕調查局、或警備總部會來把我抓去，寒蟬效應指數：0。不過現在不同了，面對這龐然巨物想起它過去的記錄，我已經開始害怕了，你呢？寒蟬效應指數：1。所謂寒蟬效應，是人民由於害怕，自動禁聲，過去我們的父母最常對我們說的就是，囝仔人有耳無嘴，惦惦不要亂說話。連李登輝都改口了，"這樣的選舉結果對台灣不是很壞"，接下來有幾個公眾人物我們要觀察，杜正勝、莊國榮、謝志偉、鄭弘儀、江霞、楊烈，我們台灣派一定要好好保護他們，希望寒蟬效應指數不要飆升，天佑台灣。
p.s. 響應魚夫的民主逆風前進 落實媒體公民權！今後台灣派要團結起來，有系統的串連全世界認同台灣本土的網路人民，部落格、瀏覽者、個人網路電視台等，匯為一股強大的力量，一起來為台灣打拼。
選後第一期的新台灣新聞週刊2008/03/27 第627期／誰來呵護本土？
剛剛看完自由時報電子報，覺得編輯一反選前藍綠對立的辛辣語言，一味的以包容之心，期待中國國民黨及其領導人(對不起，我總統叫不出來)能帶領台灣走向更進步的未來，可謂用心良苦。另外在funP的幾篇選後感言的文章裏，看到一些回應，也都是普遍傳達消弭對立負面的溫馨語言。這真可以看出台灣人純真無邪的一面，以一位深愛台灣母親的小民來說，雖然無法那麼樂觀，也不好再說什麼，只能說拭目以待，但是最重要的還是要靠自己。
大話新聞(08/3/23)第五段，要求馬英九馬上釋出七點善意，就可檢驗他的誠意，
1) 單一選區兩票制，票票要等值
2) 公投法捕正，降低門檻
3) 中國國民黨還黨產
4) 說明綠卡，沒有失效的話，填I-407宣誓放棄
5) 陽光法案 (民進黨版本)
6) 引渡逃到中國的經濟犯
7) 周美青辭掉兆豐金高級主管，馬唯中放棄美國籍
下面是我從鯨魚網站摘錄來的，連結至幾位台灣派部落格前輩的文章，讓我們發揮網路的力量，一起來發聲監督馬英九。
失之交臂的黃金交叉 --- 夢裡不知身是客 | 引用網址
逆轉失敗，下次再來 --- 與媒體對抗 | 引用網址
坦然面對台灣共業 --- 年糕料理館 | 引用網址
再出發 --- 妙子的故鄉翦影 | 引用網址
接受張大魯的說法，只能恭喜馬英九 --- 簡余晏部落格 | 引用網址
Republic of Cheating --- 雪地的朋友 | 引用網址
一個錯亂的泛藍時代悄悄來了 --- Why & Why not | 引用網址
今天台灣人用自己神聖寶貴的一票，選出中國台灣地區領導人，把本來朝有尊嚴的台灣國邁進的國格，自動降格為虛無的中華民國。那七百多萬的台灣人，忘了5年前SARS的時候，中國人沙祖康，"誰理你們"的那付嘴臉，忘了台灣的各種選手在無數次國際的場合，揚眉吐氣為台灣爭光時，卻遭到中國無情的打壓，連國旗也拿不出去的悲哀，台灣人在國際上是多麼的沒有尊嚴，你們知道嗎？喊「中華民國」只能在自己的家裏爽，全世界誰理你啊！
中華民國來的「總統」只能到一些小不點的國家去充充面子，過去陳水扁稱為"拼外交"，其實從來就是都走不出去。如果馬英九要有辦法，能和美國、日本等大國建立國對國的邦交，能將國外的各式各樣奇奇怪怪名稱的辦事處，通通改為大使館及領事館，讓台灣人(或是你稱的中華民國國民)能有尊嚴的與國際其他一百八十幾個國家平起平坐，那時候我就尊稱你一聲「總統」，否則你現在充其量，只不過是「台灣地區領導人」。
我們現在在野了，沒有執政的包袱，你們過去罵民進黨政府的，我們要一條一條的看你怎麼做的比民進黨政府好？請給人民交代，我要看你怎麼應付中國隨時可以攻擊過來的一千多顆飛彈？我要看你如何用一中各表，讓台灣有尊嚴的與中國簽訂50年的和平協定？要是你有做不好或做不到的地方，我要看你如何向那七百多萬支持你的台灣人交代？
繼續閱讀......
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